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The dialogue between the natural sciences and theology is frequently complimented by 
additional dialogue partners, such as historians, poets, literature scholars, and most 
frequently, philosophers. The goal of this paper is to test both the relevance and fruitfulness 
of one particular philosophical theory of consciousness for key issues in science-religions 
dialogue. The philosophical theory in question is panpsychism. This examination of 
panpsychism within science-religion is timely and relevant because panpsychism is currently 
undergoing a significant revival in philosophy of mind, and yet the potential impact of this 
revival for the science-religion dialogue has yet been unrealized.  
Panpsychists argue that mentality is fully natural, in that it is fundamental to the universe, but 
not reducible to the physical. As is shown in the first section of this paper, panpsychism 
offers itself as a via media between physicalism and dualism. It is worth noting that one type 
of panpsychism, namely panexperientialism, has had a central role within process theology. 
Process theology has been a prominent philosophical platform from which to construct the 
dialogue between science and religion, but it comes with a host of idiosyncratic theological 
commitments in tow. The impetus for this paper is the substantial revival in panpsychist 
thought, outside of process metaphysics, from (mostly secular) philosophers of mind, such as 
Galen Strawson, David J. Chalmers, Thomas Nagel, William Seager, and Philip Goff, to 
name only a few. This new and growing body of scholarship allows this paper to disentangle 
panpsychism from the overarching system of process thought, and consider its potential for 
science and religion independently.1 
In order to explore the positive impact that panpsychism might have if adopted as a research 
program within science-and-religion dialogue, this paper explores two test cases: special 
divine action and theistic evolution. Both of these test cases have been chosen as a result of 
their prevalence within science-religion dialogue over recent decades. The large quantity of 
literature addressing divine action and theistic evolution, which cannot be exhaustively dealt 
                                                     
1 For example, panpsychist philosophers can (and most do) maintain a substance-based metaphysic. In addition, 
a theistic panpsychist need not adopt the God of process theism. That is, a panpsychist theologian is free to hold 
to a non-bipolar, Trinitarian God of unlimited power who created the world ex nihilo. Indeed, panpsychism does 
not determine or prescribe any particular doctrine of God. 
with in this paper, testify that these areas of research continue to be of great importance and 
concern to many people. This paper makes an original contribution to these discussions by 
arguing that contemporary philosophical panpsychism can aid Christian theologians to 
dialogue with the natural sciences in articulating God’s action through quantum phenomena 
and God’s providential guidance of evolution.  
That said, if panpsychism is considered entirely incompatible with the relevant scientific 
disciplines, then few in the science-religion dialogue would offer panpsychism more than a 
passing and dismissive glance. For example, Philip Clayton curtly rejects panpsychism on the 
grounds that as “a robustly metaphysical move” it “cuts [itself] off from the evidential 
considerations that science could otherwise provide.”2 Although using the natural sciences to 
verify or falsify a philosophical framework is always a fraught exercise, some amount of 
corroborative resonance is a reasonable desideratum. Without such resonance, no amount of 
theological benefit or philosophical argumentation is likely to persuade scholars working at 
the forefront of the science-religion to consider panpsychism seriously. In order to counter 
Clayton’s condemnation of panpsychism, therefore, this paper must evaluate the extent to 
which panpsychism, as a metaphysical hypothesis, is compatible with the principles and 
provisional conclusions of the scientific disciplines most relevant to these test cases, namely 
evolutionary biology and quantum physics.  
It should be emphasised that at no point does this paper argue that the current state of 
scientific research strongly supports a panpsychist metaphysic. The argument is only that 
panpsychism is compatible and can be seen to find some limited, but significant, areas of 
resonance or traction with the natural sciences. It is undeniable that panpsychism flies in the 
face of modern intuitions about the non-human world, but then again, so does much in 
contemporary science. I suggest that the resonance which panpsychism finds with some 
interpretations of quantum physics and evolutionary biology should be sufficient for scholars 
within the science and religion dialogue to at least explore the implications for panpsychism 
for their own field. If science-religion scholars are willing to entertain panpsychism, then it 
quickly becomes apparent that the potential gains are significant. Indeed, I suggest that if 
science and religion scholars continue to be committed to articulating non-interventionist 
theologies of divine action then panpsychism is most promising way forward.  
                                                     
2 Philip Clayton, Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 130. 
Introducing Contemporary Panpsychism 
Panpsychism is not an extremely well-known theory of consciousness within contemporary 
theology or science-and-religion. However, panpsychism is currently enjoying a significant 
level of renewed attention by (largely secular) philosophers of mind, as attested to by the 
rapid rate of publications in this area.3 The first task of this paper, then, is to give a brief, 
somewhat general, description of panpsychism in its contemporary form.  
As stated above, panpsychism is the theory that (proto) consciousness, or experience, or 
subjectivity of some kind is fundamental to the entire universe.4 This standard definition 
comes from leading panpsychists William Seager, Philip Goff and Sean Allen-Hermanson:  
 Panpsychism is the view that mentality is fundamental and ubiquitous in 
the natural world.5 
‘Fundamental’ here refers to a substance, property or process which is a basic part of our 
universe, existing for as long as the universe has existed, deriving its existence from nothing 
else within the universe. To put it another way, Thomas Nagel, whose 1979 essay 
“Panpsychism” is widely attributed with reigniting interest in the topic, defines panpsychism 
as “the view that the basic physical constituents of the universe have mental properties.”6 A 
fundamental or basic entity is neither emergent through natural processes, nor infused into an 
organism by divine intervention, but exists as long as the universe has existed. In this way, 
panpsychism differs from other realist theories of consciousness such as emergence theory, 
whereby mind emerges from the complexity of matter, or classical substance dualisms, 
whereby God gifts a soul/mind to some animals upon conception or embryonic development. 
Most contemporary panpsychists, whilst denying the reality of neither the mental nor the 
                                                     
3 See, for example, the two large edited volumes and monographs on panpsychism published just in the last 
year; William Seager (ed.), Routledge Companion to Panpsychism (New York: Routledge, 2017); Godehard 
Brüntrop and Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017); David Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017); Philip Goff, 
Consciousness and Fundamental Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).  
4 In this paper, I see consciousness, experience and subjectivity to be interchangeable concepts. Subjectivity is 
the capacity for a subjective experience; that is, experience from a first-person viewpoint. Similarly, to be 
conscious, or to have consciousness, is to have experiences from a first-person perspective. Although a human 
consciousness (and most likely an animal consciousness) contains additional capacities, volition, rationality, 
intentionality, self-consciousness etc. I am not presupposing these capacities within the term ‘consciousness’. It 
is because I am referring to the most minimal form of consciousness as experience that the word (proto) is here 
placed in brackets.  
5 Goff, Philip, Seager, William and Allen-Hermanson, Sean, "Panpsychism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL: 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/panpsychism/>. Accessed: 11/01/18. 
6 Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 181.  
material, seek to eschew traditional dualisms by underlying that what we call ‘material’ and 
‘mental’ always come together and cannot be separated.  
Whilst panpsychists vehemently deny the emergence of consciousness from the entirely non-
consciousness many emphasise that weaker forms or emergence, or alternative theories of 
mental combination, must play an important part in the development of consciousness. It is 
through theories of either emergence or combination that panpsychists avoid implying that all 
objects (tables, rocks, oceans, whales, higher apes, etc.) in the universe are equally 
consciousness – which would seem to be a reductio ad absurdum.7 In addition, a theistic 
panpsychist will almost certainly want to say that God infused the universe with soul or mind 
from the beginning so that this quality of the universe is still attributable to the Creator, to 
whom we can then express gratitude. Panpsychism does not presuppose that mind is eternal, 
akin to deity, or uncreated, and so is not to be confused with pantheism or polytheism.8 Thus, 
panpsychism is entirely compatible with traditional forms of monotheism. Whilst 
panpsychism is compatible in these qualified ways with emergence theory and a divine-
infusion model of the origin of consciousness, it seems incompatible with non-realist theories 
of consciousness (materialism, reductive physicalism, epiphenomenalism, functionalism, 
etc.).  
The question of the relationship between material structures or the physical causal nexus and 
the immaterial mind has become known as “the hard question of consciousness.” As 
panpsychist philosopher David Chalmers (who posed this question in its contemporary form) 
asks, “how can physical properties alone give rise to conscious qualia?”9 This problem is 
commonly localized to humanity and referred to as ‘the mind-body problem’. However, since 
human bodies arise from, interact with, and return to the dust of the ground and stars, the 
mind-body problem cannot be limited to a question concerning human beings. Instead, this 
“hard question” quickly becomes a broader problem of how to locate or understand the 
phenomenon of experience in the universe at all, given the presupposition the vast majority of 
the cosmos is purely material and can be mechanistically explained through empirical and 
                                                     
7 This is a wide spread misunderstanding of panpsychism. As David Skrbina has shown in his fairly 
comprehensive study of the history of panpsychism in Western philosophy, only one or two panpsychists have 
ever implied anything of this sort. See, Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West. 
8 For a discussion on the relationship of panpsychism to polytheism and pantheism when mentality is identified 
to divinity see, Yujin Nagasawa, ‘Panpsychism versus Pantheism, Polytheism, and Cosmopsychism’, William 
Seager (ed.), Routledge Companion of Panpsychism, Routledge, forthcoming. 
9 David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search for a Fundamental Theory (New York: Oxford University 
Press,1996), 303-305. 
reductive means. As Thomas Nagel has argued, if we take the evolution of self-conscious 
homo sapien’s seriously, the mind-body problem “is not just a local problem... but that it 
invades our understanding of the entire cosmos and its history.”10 The question of 
consciousness does not just ask, ‘what does it mean to be human?’, but ‘what is the nature of 
this cosmos in which we find ourselves? Is this truly our home?’ As such it is unsurprising 
that questions of consciousness are never far from the discussions concerning the relationship 
between science and religion.  
Panpsychism and Quantum Physics  
Quantum physics is probably the most conducive discipline within the natural sciences for 
engagement with speculative metaphysics. Notorious for its ability to support the wild and 
wacky, one has to exercise some caution when discussing the metaphysics of quantum 
mechanics; but that does not exclude the possibility of genuine discovery. Physics is 
sometimes depicted as the most foundational of the natural sciences because the deepest 
questions physicists seek to answer concern the origins and fundamental nature of the 
empirical universe. The idea within panpsychism, that consciousness is fundamental 
throughout the universe, already implies the need for philosophers and theologians to 
dialogue with physicists regarding the nature of that which is most fundamental. Although 
physicists such as Thomas Edison and Arthur Eddington arguably held panpsychist views 
prior to the rise of quantum psychics, the discovery of quantum phenomena seems to add 
support to the possibility of the proliferation of consciousness throughout the universe.11  
Early quantum physicist Sir James Jean wrote that “The quantum phenomena make it 
possible to propose that the background of the universe is mind-like.” It is for this reason that 
“The universe begins to look more like a great thought than a great machine.”12 Another early 
example of drawing a panpsychist conclusion by employing “Quantum Mechanics as a Basis 
for Philosophy” comes from J.B.S. Haldane. Haldane, in the aforementioned paper, argued 
that mind is a “resonance phenomena”, associated with the wave-like, rather than particle-
                                                     
10 Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost 
Certainly False (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 3.   
11 Paul Carus, “Panpsychism and panbiotism” The Monist 3, 234-257 (243) quotes Thomas Edison:  “All matter 
lives, and everything that lives possess intelligence... The atom is conscious if man is conscious... I cannot avoid 
the conclusion that all matter is composed of intelligent atoms and that life and mind are merely synonyms for 
the aggregation of atomic intelligence.” Arthur Eddington wrote that, “All through the physical world runs that 
unknown content, which must surely be the stuff of our consciousness.” A. Eddington, Space, Time and 
Gravitation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920), 200.  
12James Jeans, The Mysterious Universe (New York: Macmillan, 1931), 158. 
like, aspect of atomic phenomena. As a result, he interpreted the tunnelling effect (where an 
electron can pass through an insulating barrier) as primitive “purposive behaviour”.13 
Haldane’s theory captures the basic idea behind many panpsychist interpretations of quantum 
quandaries.14 
One version of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which gives the 
greatest support to panpsychism, is the theory that the quantum probabilities are reduced to 
one actuality (referred to as, the wave function collapse), not by uncaused indeterminism, but 
by the act of measurement. First, this implies a causal relationship between classical 
apparatus (which does the measuring) and quantum events (which are ‘measured’). Second, 
as further interpreted by physicists such as John von Neumann, Eugene Wigner and John 
Wheeler, this hypothesis implies a causal relationship between consciousness and wave-
function collapse.15 The question arises: what level of consciousness is needed to collapse the 
wave function and is the collapse ever objective fact? If the complexity of human 
consciousness in the deliberate act of measurement is required (or if humans are the only 
conscious beings in the universe), then this implies a strange and excessively anthropocentric 
conclusion that the universe was indeterminate until twentieth century physicists worked out 
how to measure quantum probabilities! If consciousness does indeed play a causal role in 
collapsing the wave function (and of course this is still a very big “if”), then the more 
plausible conclusion is that there exists a mental nexus through which causation can occur, 
beyond that of human or animal interactions – indeed, throughout the entire universe.  
Perhaps the best developed quantum approach to panpsychism is by physicist Stuart 
Hameroff and mathematician Roger Penrose. Hameroff and Penrose focus on the uniquely 
                                                     
13 J.B. S. Haldane, “Quantum mechanics as a basis for philosophy”, Philosophy of Science 1: 78-98, 89. 
14 A. Cochran in 1971 wrote that “the quantum mechanical wave properties are actually the conscious properties 
of matter” so that “atoms and fundamental particles have a rudimentary degree of consciousness, volition, or 
self-activity.” A. Cochran, “The relationship between physics and biology” Foundations in Physics, 1, no.3 235-
250, 236.Freeman Dyson in 1979 suggested that “mind is always inherent in every electron, and the processes of 
human consciousness differ only in degree but not in kind from the processes of choice between quantum states 
which we call “chance” when they are made by electrons.” F. Dyson, Disturbing the Universe (London: Harper 
& Row, 1979), 249. Even more philosophically, Danah Zohar in 1990 wrote that “the wave/particle duality of 
quantum ‘stuff’ becomes the most primarily mind/body relationship in the world.”  D. Zohar, The Quantum Self, 
(New York/London: Bloomsbury, 1990), 80.  
15 John von Neumann first proposed this surprisingly resilient interpretation of the measurement phenomenon in 
the nineteen-thirties. Whereas Eugene Wigner interpreted the role of consciousness in the wave collapse as 
solipsism, John Wheeler saw it as an indication that we live in a “participatory universe”; one than cannot be 
accurately described without factoring in our own subjective involvement. The idea that reality is participatory 
has grown (moderately) in popularity in recent years. For a recent introductory level discussion of these issues 
see, Philip Ball, “Conscioulsy quantum: How to make everything real”, New Scientist Is. 3151, (Nov. 2017), 29-
32. 
non-algorithmic collapse of superimposed quantum events within the non-algorithmic 
intuition and problem-solving capacities of the human brain. By focusing on the collapse of 
quantum events within the human brain, Hameroff and Penrose moved the relationship of 
consciousness-to-collapse from that of an external observer (the scientist or measurement 
equipment) to the quantum event itself. This “objective reduction” from the quantum 
phenomena (rather than a ‘subjective’ external observer) entails a form of panpsychism. 
Hameroff concludes that “perhaps panpsychists are in some way correct and components of 
mental processes are fundamental, like mass, spin, of charge.” 16 
However, the Copenhagen interpretation is not the only possible way of understanding the 
weird and wonderful world of quantum physics. One alternative is the more determinist 
“Hidden-Variables” interpretation, proposed by David Bohm. Bohm suggests that there are 
hidden variables throughout the universe to which scientists do not yet have access, and 
which explain the seemingly random behaviour of quantum particles/waves. Surprisingly, 
Bohm also endorsed a form of panpsychism.17  
Bohm argued that there is a “guiding wave” or “pilot wave” throughout reality which 
determines quantum behaviour (such as determining which slit a particle passes through in 
the dual-slit experiment). Bohm went on to argue that the guiding wave points towards an 
“implicate order”, which “applies to both matter and to consciousness.”18 Bohm defends a 
unified monistic worldview whereby “consciousness and matter in general are basically the 
same order (i.e. the implicate order as a whole).”19 Bohm suggests that this implicate order is 
governed by information content. Bohm argues that “the notion of information [is] something 
that need not belong only to human consciousness, but that may indeed be present in some 
sense, even in inanimate systems of atoms and electrons”.20 The idea that the underlying 
nature of reality is informational has become increasingly popular. When combined with 
                                                     
16 S. Hameroff, “Funda-mentality: Is the conscious mind subtly linked to a basic level of the universe?”, Trends 
in Cognitive Science 2, no.4, 121; cf. S. Hameroff “More neural than Thou”, in Toward a Science of 
Consciousness II, ed. S. Hameroff et al. (MIT Press, 1998). 
17 Appealing to the idea the argument for panpsychism from continuity Bohm argues, “That which we 
experience as mind. . .  will in a natural way ultimately reach the level of the wavefunction and the ‘dance’ of 
particles. There is no unbridgeable gap or barrier between any of these levels. . .  It is implied that, in some 
sense, a rudimentary consciousness is present even at the level of particles physics.” David Bohm, “A new 
theory of the relationship of mind and matter”, Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research 80, no.2, 
131. 
18 David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order, (London: Routledge, 1980), 196.  
19 Bohm, Wholeness , 208. 
20 David Bohm, “A new theory of the relationship of mind and matter”, Journal of the American Society for 
Psychical Research 80, no.2, 124-125. 
GiulioTononi’s idea of integrated information theory, which argues that complex 
consciousness in the brain arises out of the integration between information states, these ideas 
point towards a possible panpsychist solution to the mind-body problem.21 This also shows 
that a panpsychist theory of consciousness in no way needs to undermine the importance of 
neurology and neuroscience for understanding animal consciousness. 
More recently, polymath and religious naturalist Stuart A. Kauffman, best known in the 
science-and-religion dialogue for his development of systems based thinking, published both 
an article in Theology & Science and a monograph in 2016, which changes his position on 
consciousness from that of strong emergence to that of panpsychism.22 Kaufmann’s main 
contribution in this recent work has been to outline the potential impact that Bohm’s 
panpsychist interpretation of quantum physics has by reintroducing soul-talk into science-
and-religion and positing the existence of a cosmic mind. What is striking about this 
argument is that Kaufman’s new and unorthodox position arises as an interpretation of the 
mathematical and experimental evidence of quantum physics and Kauffman clearly 
articulates his concern over the “testable” (and non-testable) aspects of his proposal.23 
Kauffman’s argument for panpsychism results from an interpretation of quantum theory, 
whereby measurement, and therefore mind, mediates potentialities (which as Schrödinger’s 
cat thought experiment illustrates, do not obey the law of the excluded middle) into 
actualities (which do obey the law of the excluded middle) at the quantum level. If 
measurement requires mind (consciousness, free-will and intentionality), and quantum events 
are mediated by measurement, unless the universe was in a state of complete superposition 
and indeterminacy until the emergence of a conscious organism, then this argument clearly 
supports panpsychism.  Kaufman writes,  
Thus, perhaps measurement is mediated by mind at many levels- perhaps 
down to the idea that quantum variables can measure one another, 
perhaps consciously and with free will...Here is a vast participatory 
                                                     
21 This solution is currently supported by leading neuroscientist Christoph Koch and philosophers such as David 
J. Chalmers and Gregg Rosenberg. See, Christof Koch, “In which I argue that consciousness is a fundamental 
property of complex things”, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014); David J. Chalmers, The Character of 
Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Gregg Rosenberg, “Land Ho? We Are Close to a 
Synoptic Understanding of Consciousness”, Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives (eds.) Godehard 
Brüntrop and Ludwig Jaskolla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 153-177. 
22 Stuart A. Kauffman, “Cosmic Mind?” Theology and Science, (2016) 14:1, 36-47; Stuart A. Kauffman, 
Humanity in a Creative Universe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).  
23 Kristi Keller, “Response to Stuart Kauffman: The Cosmic Mind and NIODA”, Theology and Science (2016) 
14.1, 54-58; Kauffman, “Cosmic Minds?”, 36, 38, 40, 43, 45.  
panpsychism, in which something like cosmic mind or minds become 
thinkable.24 
If credible, Kauffman’s highly speculative proposal offers some significant advantages. 
Kauffman argues that his panpsychist interpretation of quantum mechanics offers a single 
elegant explanation for the double-slit experiment, the “entangled variable”, of non-local and 
non-causal interaction (the famous Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment), and the 
relationship between quantum and classical physics. Whilst interpretations of quantum 
physics all remain highly contested, the support from respected physicists and the 
interpretative resonance which panpsychism finds within this field is startlingly strong. What 
then might all this mean for theology and the science-religion dialogue? For this, we turn to 
the first test case: special divine action.  
Test Case 1: Special Divine Action  
One of the most substantial collaborative research projects within the contemporary field of 
science and religion focused specifically on the issue of divine action. The sustained research 
between The Vatican Observatory and The Centre for Theology and the Nature Sciences 
resulted in five edited volumes, containing 91 chapters from 51 authors, with the shared 
subtitle Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. The large scale of this project has meant 
that this work has dominated discussions and framed much of the methodology within the 
relatively new discipline of science-and-religion more widely. Almost a third of the chapters 
published as a result of this research sought to draw interpretations of quantum mechanics 
into theological discussion. It is, therefore, widely accepted that philosophical interpretations 
of quantum mechanics are of significance for the science-religion community, particularly 
regarding the question of how God acts in the world. The theory of ontological indeterminism 
(Heisenberg’s interpretation) has dominated the field of science and religion, largely as a 
result of the contributions from Robert J. Russell. However, since panpsychism remains a 
viable implication of quantum physics, as well as receiving attention from philosophers of 
mind, it is important for theologians to consider the implications of a panpsychist 
interpretation of quantum mechanics for models of divine action. In particular, panpsychism 
deserves equal and serious attention as one way of framing God’s interaction within creation, 
in discrete times and places to make a genuine causal difference (special divine action).  
                                                     
24 Kauffman, “Cosmic Minds?”, 38.  
Russell’s proposal broadly argues that because quantum events are ontologically 
indeterminate, God can choose which way the wave function collapses without violating the 
principle of energy conservation, interrupting causal closure or undermining the determined 
nature of physical events at the level of classical physics. There are a number of potential 
problems within Russell’s proposal,25 but for the sake of brevity I will focus on one important 
question that arises: How much or how frequently does God resolve quantum probabilities 
into actualities? Arthur Peacocke suggests that if God always and in all ways determines 
quantum events, and these events impact upwardly upon the manifest world, then Russell’s 
proposal cannot escape the charge of occasionalism.26 However, John Polkinghorne has 
pointed out that if God only determined a few quantum events – because not all quantum 
events are indeterminate enough to allow God to act without breaking causal closure – then 
Russell’s account of divine action is an insufficiently “episodic account of providential 
agency.” 27   
In response to this challenging question Russell, following Nancey Murphy, argues that God 
is active in all quantum events, but not in an all-determining fashion.28 Since God is not 
acting in an all-determining fashion, Russell’s proposal cannot be accused of occasionalism. 
Similarly, because God is seen to act in every quantum event, then this is not as woefully 
episodic as Polkinghorne fears. Instead, Russell writes that this model involves “a continuous 
creative (divine) presence within each (quantum) event, co-determining the outcome of these 
elementary physical processes.”29 Russell has successfully avoided both Peacocke’s and 
Polkinghorne’s challenges, but in so doing has created a new question: What is the “within” 
that becomes essential for allowing God to act in a non-determining and co-operative manner 
as the quantum level?  
How is the “within each (quantum) event” to be understood in Russell’s proposal of divine 
action? It seems unlikely, given the non-material nature of divine presence and from what we 
know of quantum particles/waves, that this can be interpreted in a spatial way, like how a gas 
                                                     
25 See, Nicholas Saunders,  Divine Action and Modern Science, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), chapter 6.  
26 Arthur Peacocke, “God’s Interaction with the World: The Implications of Deterministic ‘Chaos’ and of the 
Interconnected and Interdependent Complexity”, Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine 
Action, (ed.) Robert J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur Peacocke (Vatican State/ Berkeley, CA: Vatican 
State Observatory/ Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1995), 279-281. 
27 John Polkinghorne, Science and Creation, 58; Science and Providence, 27-28; Reason and Reality, 40-41. 
28 Robert J. Russell, Cosmology: From Alpha to Omega (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008), 154; Nancey 
Murphy, “Divine Action in the Natural Order” Chaos and Complexity, 340-342.  
29 Russell, Cosmology, 156. Italics added. 
can be within a jar by taking up the space within the jar. Moreover, a literally spatial 
interpretation of Russell’s proposal here gives no aid to understanding the conundrum of 
divine-creaturely co-determination. And yet the language of God working within the universe, 
within creatures, and within creaturely action is one which many find intuitively helpful and 
meaningful. A better interpretation of such language would be to posit that quantum 
particles/waves have a non-spatial “within” by virtue of having mental experiences. This is 
how we commonly use the word “within” when referring to God’s presence within human 
beings, or when stating that the mind resides “within” the brain/body.  
This experiential usage of the term “within” evokes a comparison to the uniquely direct and 
intimate relationship between the mind and the brain, or between God and the mind of a 
Christian believer. In this way, Russell’s use of the word “within” could be extended to draw 
upon the concept of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. In Scripture and the collective 
experience of the Church the indwelling of the Spirit is a hidden, mystical, but also 
experiential presence. Although I have not found any suggestion in Russell’s own work of a 
connection between the ‘within’ of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in Christian spirituality 
and his own articulation of God acting ‘within’ quantum events, it is a connection which 
could be a great theological resource to his proposal.  
A panpsychist ontology is a way of articulating that all things have a “within”. Without this 
panpsychist ontology, without a ‘within’ for God to indwell, any statement on Russell’s (and 
Murphy’s) account of co-operation between elementary physical processes and Divine agency 
can only be poetic wordplay. The movement (spin, charge, direction, probabilities) of a 
quantum particle/wave, understood materialistically, cannot be co-operative with, but can 
only be co-opted by, God. It is unlikely that “co-determining” outcomes is possible when 
there is only one active agent (and in particular, when that sole agent is the Divine Creator). If 
there is no objective “within” and no genuine co-determination, then Russell’s proposal 
cannot escape the charges of occasional or episodic intervention outlined above. 
Panpsychism, which posits a genuine “within” in terms of subjectivity or experience, provides 
the possibility of genuine co-operation or co-determination even at the quantum level. 
The theologian who has perhaps done the most to elucidate a form of divine-creaturely co-
operation through subjectivity is Philip Clayton, best known for his theology of emergence 
theory. For Clayton “God must persuade the agent in question to act in a particular way for 
the event to occur.”30 This concern for creaturely persuasion and participation seems to arise 
chiefly in response to the moral charges against interventionism; the concerned to avoid a 
divine invasion, which violates nature or interrupt the causal nexus. As Clayton highlights, 
divine persuasion presupposes creaturely subjects. Clayton writes, “[t]his [divine persuasion], 
again, implies a special role for mental causes...Intentional agents can be persuaded, whereas 
(as far as we know) rocks cannot be persuaded to act on their own, no matter how good the 
arguments.”31 It is far easier to dismiss a unified “rock-consciousness” (which no 
panpsychists I have read support) than it is to rule out the possibility of a quantum-level 
nexus of experience and subjectivity which God may influence in a persuasive manner. 
Since Clayton champions strong emergence theory, where mental cause and properties only 
emerge at a higher (neurological) level of the natural world, Clayton concedes that his 
proposal “limits the efficacy of the divine will in the world” because “this result makes it 
difficult to conceive a divine influence on rocks or other purely physical systems apart from 
the laws and initial conditions established by God at creation.”32 Clayton’s strong emergence 
theory means that special divine action is limited to the mental realm and can only impact the 
material world via human (or higher-animal) mediation. The result of Clayton’s proposal is 
the view that God was unable to interact with creatures and truly locked “outside of” creation 
for billions of years. This is a proposal that many will find unhelpfully anthropocentric, in 
that God needs human beings as mediators if God is to impact the natural world, and more 
widely contrary to both the sovereignty and relational nature of God. 
In contrast to Clayton, the main advantage of the quantum model for special divine action is 
due to the fundamental and ubiquitous nature of quantum events/particles/waves: “God is 
active everywhere in space and time in relation to ψ as it extends throughout space and 
evolves in time.”33 Locating divine action in quantum events means that theologians can 
account for the pervasiveness of divine action in the billions of years prior to the 
phenomenon of life, and God can be just as effective in the far reaches of the universe as on 
planet earth. Thus, a panpsychist quantum account of divine action can avoid the threats of 
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interventionism (as well as occasionalism and episodic intermissions), whilst additionally 
providing an objective and causal understanding of omnipresence.  
On the basis of this unique fundamentality of quanta, Russell argues that “quantum physics 
contributes a necessary – thought not a sufficient- piece to the explanatory puzzle of how 
God acts in the world.”34  In particular, Russell emphasises that his model is not sufficient for 
articulating “divine active in personal experience and human history, because that is 
primarily where we, as persons of faith, encounter the living God.”35 For this, he argues, we 
need to look more closely at the level of mind and persons. But Russell notes that “we will 
eventually need to work out the detailed relations between these [quantum based and 
personal] models by integrating them into a consistent and coherent, adequate and applicable 
metaphysical framework.”36 The best metaphysical framework currently available for relating 
top-down mental causation and quantum mechanics seems to be something like panpsychism; 
God interacts with minds throughout the universe, from the most unimaginably simple 
mentality of a quantum particle/wave, to the sophisticated self-consciousness of a human 
person. 
Panpsychism and Evolutionary Biology 
The second area of natural science from which panpsychists commonly seek to draw support 
is evolutionary biology. Although evolutionary biology has greatly developed since Charles 
Darwin published his Origin of the Species in 1859, the underlying principle of continuity 
between species remains largely unchallenged. It is, therefore, still of interest that some early 
evolutionary theorists, professed panpsychist beliefs on the basis of this continuity between 
all things. 
A significant number of historically renowned scholars (such as Ernst Haeckel, William 
Kingdon Clifford, Herbert Spencer and Morton Price) saw Darwin’s theory of evolution to 
support a philosophy of panpsychist monism.37 However it is William James (1842-1910) 
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who gives panpsychism one its most famous treatments, which continues to influence 
panpsychist philosophers today. In Principles of Psychology, James wrote, 
If evolution is to work smoothly, consciousness in some shape must have 
been present at the very origin of things. Accordingly, we find that the 
most clear-sighted evolutionary philosophers are beginning to posit it 
there. Each atom of the nebula, they suppose, must have had an 
aboriginal atom of consciousness linked with it. Some such doctrine...is 
an indispensible part of a thorough-going philosophy of evolution.38 
This is a clear statement of what panpsychists philosophers call ‘the argument for 
panpsychism from continuity’, which as a theory of monism seems to find traction with the 
underlying principle of continuity within evolution. It is worth noting that the argument from 
continuity, whilst in opposition to a purely emergence based theory of consciousness 
(whereby the higher-levels of reality emerge to create, as if miraculously out of nothing, 
wholly different kind of phenomena), does uphold a layered view of the natural world. That 
is, panpsychism upholds the reality of nature’s levels and layers of complexity, within a 
continuous unbroken spectrum of material-mental reality.  
As James expressed well, panpsychism is a “philosophy of evolution”, found at the interface 
of metaphysics and speculative biology, and not an easily testable hypothesis. The basic 
principle is that, if the outcome of evolutionary is psycho-physical (humanity), then the 
constituents and very process of evolution will also be psycho-physical.39 One consequence 
of panpsychism, when taken as the metaphysical implication of evolutionary continuity, is the 
humanity cannot be considered utterly, radically, or ontologically unique by virtue of human 
consciousness (rationality, mind, or a soul). Although panpsychism still holds that humans 
have a distinct and quantifiably different consciousness to other creatures, theological 
arguments regarding human uniqueness (in a stronger, qualitative, sense) will have to be 
grounded elsewhere.  
Perhaps one of the most well-known panpsychists within the science-religion dialogue is the 
French Jesuit palaeontologist, Peirre Teilhard de Chardin. Teilhard took the continuity of 
evolutionary theory to mean that,  
we are logically forced to assume the existence in rudimentary form... of 
some sort of psyche in every corpuscle, even in those (the mega-molecles 
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and below) whose complexity is of such low or modest order as to render 
it (the psyche) imperceptible.40  
Teilhard even characterized the process of evolution as “the movement of consciousness 
veiled by morphology”, which lead him to his famous “great law of complexity and 
consciousness”.41 It is this panpsychist law that gives the universe a “psychically convergent 
structure or curvature.”42 Teilhard, of course, goes on to synthesize evolution with Christian 
eschatology and so to convert his philosophy of panpsychism into a theology of 
“panChristism”.43 Whatever one thinks of Teilhard’s overarching project, it is noteworthy 
that for Teilhard’s vision of evolution, panpsychism is the necessary bridge to Christian 
theology and the ontology on which theistic evolution can be most robustly supported. 
More recently, an increasingly number of biologists are exploring the possibility that natural 
selection may only be one means amongst many in which evolution occurs. Other forces, 
such as genetic drift (particular in small populations), endogenous factors whereby internally 
selection is collective achieved, Thompson’s “laws of form” and Kauffman’s “order for 
free”,44 sexual selection, genetic assimilation, and genetic accommodation may be equally 
important for species survival in different circumstances.45 These other mechanisms by which 
evolution may take place compliment (and do not replace) the theory of natural selection. 
However, it is important to note that most of these means of evolution imply a level of 
teleology, and with teleology a limited sense of agency or experience already present within 
evolving organisms. Biologist Tam Hunt, for example, argues that a general theory of how 
evolutionary change occurs may need to presuppose the power of expectation (as in the 
expected reproductive fitness of a possible sexual partner) and agential selection to be wide-
spread throughout the natural world and universe. He describes this as “a panpsychist 
extension of Darwin’s theory of sexual selection which explicitly recognizes the role of mind 
at all levels of nature and which may play the part of a general theory of evolution better than 
natural selection theory.”46 One can also see in Thomas Nagel’s controversial book Mind and 
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a philosophical argument for a “postmaterialist theory” of evolution. Put simply, Nagel 
argues that if evolution brought about consciousness, then evolution cannot be “just a 
physical process”, but “may have to be something more than physical all the way down.”47 
Famously, biologist Simon Conway Morris’ theory of convergence has led him to suggest 
that panpsychism is not only philosophically plausible, but is an empirically justifiable (but 
not verifiable) claim. Convergence refers to the phenomenon whereby species, which are not 
closely genetically related, evolve similar traits as a result of having to adapt to similar 
environments or ecological niches. Common examples include the flight and wings of birds, 
insects, pteosuars and bats, as well as aspects of the lens within the eye, which seems to have 
evolved to be very similar through very different genetic dynasties. One way of interpreting 
this phenomenon is to suggest some form of teleology, either overarching the process of 
evolution or within organisms in the form of striving. The latter of these two interpretations 
in particular amounts to a form of panpsychism.48 Based on his observations of the behaviour 
of non-neurologically endowed protistans and dinoflagellates, Conway Morris keeps an open 
mind on just how far down the evolutionary bush consciousness goes, and speaks with more 
confidence of “feeling” in sponges and consciousness in insects.49 Very few biologists would 
currently claim to believe in anything like panpsychism. This may be due to a widespread 
misunderstanding that panpsychism is a form of vitalism. For the sake of brevity, I am only 
able to state that the two theories are completely distinct. However, there does seem to be a 
historical and a well-reasoned trend amongst evolutionary theorists to find panpsychism 
strangely appealing. 
Test Case 2: Theistic Evolution  
Undeniably the most fraught and politically explosive issue in the dialogue between Christian 
theology and the natural sciences is the question of ‘creation versus evolution’. The either/or 
nature of this question has had an unprecedented impact on created the modern myth that 
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science and religion are always and in all matters diametrically opposed. Therefore, the 
second test case discussed in this paper is the question of theistic evolution: How does belief 
in God as both Creator and Providential Ruler relate to our understanding of the randomness 
and mechanism of natural selection in evolution?  
The theory of Intelligent Design argues that natural causes and material mechanisms 
(randomness, impersonal laws of selection, and a vast amount of time) are insufficient in 
explaining all life within the universe. Proponents of Intelligent Design argue that naturalistic 
explanations need to be complimented by a non-evolved intelligence of some sort, most 
frequently a Divine intelligence.50 Most scientists (and others) vehemently reject the idea of a 
non-evolved intelligence as a scientific hypothesis, not least because design arguments often 
rely upon non-empirically verifiable sources, most notably scripture texts and human 
intuition. Moreover, the idea that God designed the various stages of evolution faces a 
significant difficulty in accounting for seemingly “botched and bungled” history of 
development.51 Instead of a perfectly executed grand design, evolution looks more like a long 
process of trial-and-error, with vast amounts of waste and suffering endured along the way. If 
God only inputs information (designs) at certain pivotal moments in evolution (such as the 
emergence of metabolic systems or conscious awareness) then this approach easily slides into 
a God-of-the-gaps form of argumentation: the gaps in our scientific knowledge, where natural 
selection seems unable to explain jumps in evolution (such as irreducible complexity or the 
Cambrian explosion), are cited as the places where we can best see God’s direct design and 
interventionist impact. The danger of this approach is not only to greatly increase the problem 
of evil, but to risk making theology decreasingly relevant as the natural sciences advance.  
Theistic evolutionists differentiate their proposal from Intelligent Design by arguing that God 
does not interrupt or intervene directly to implement perfectly and completely designed 
creatures, but that God guides and acts within the whole process in a non-coercive fashion. 
For some theistic evolutionists, God can be said to permit suffering and waste as a part of 
evolution in a way that may appear pointless and unjustified to the human conscience. 
However, God is permitting, rather than designing or orchestrating this tragedy. For other 
theistic evolutionists, God does not even have a choice in overseeing this painful state of 
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affairs. What is a shared concern for theistic evolutionists is to minimize direct divine 
responsibility for suffering by emphasising the self-creative power and freedom which God 
grants to creation. 
John Polkinghorne succinctly defines the concept of theistic evolution as, “divine intervention 
within unfolding evolutionary process.”52 Thus, theologians such as John F. Haught, Arthur 
Peacocke, Keith Ward and Polkinghorne himself, all prefer to speak of God’s allowing 
creation the autonomy to evolve according to natural principles, thus allowing for the 
possibility of mistakes and suffering, whilst also guiding these natural principles in a co-
operative and improvisational manner. 53 Theistic evolutionists imply that if we get our 
doctrine of God correct – that is, as loving and self-giving, rather than controlling and 
coercive – then Christians need not fear the advancing understanding of evolutionary biology 
and theologians can provide some partial response to the problem of evil in the natural world. 
One can see the strong link between theistic evolution and the non-interventionist models of 
divine action of Russell and Clayton examined above. The guiding methodological principles 
are very much the same; theology and natural science can be integrated if God indirectly 
persuades, rather than directly interrupts, the forces and entities that the natural sciences 
model. Therefore, it is unsurprising that a similar question emerges out of theistic evolution 
as did out of Russell’s quantum model of divine action: What does it mean for God to 
persuade, co-operate with, and work “within” mindless material entities and evolutionary 
forces? If, as emergence theory claims, the first ten to fourteen billion years of the universe 
held no teleology, no experience, no agency, then God’s persuasion in evolution over this 
time period amounts to direct causation.54 An agent cannot interact with a totally mindless, 
non-agent in a way that makes a causal difference, by any other means than directly causing 
or forcing it to act in a way different to how it would have acted automatically (and the object 
involved is none the wiser either way). A helpful analogy may be the comparison between a 
car without a driver which is programmed to take passengers to a destination, and a car with a 
human driver.55 Both cars can negotiate various trials and obstacles along the way, but only 
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the car with a human driver can be persuaded to take a different route or reach a different 
destination.56 In order for the driver-less car to change a destination, a higher intelligence 
would have to re-program or re-design the system by inputting new information; this is 
analogous to how intelligent design theorists understand God’s providential care of evolution. 
The idea that primordial consciousness is an essential ingredient for theistic evolution, if it is 
to be a genuine alternative to materialistic neo-Darwinianism and Intelligent Design, is hinted 
at by many of its main proponents. For example, John Polkinghorne argues that “continuous 
creation” entails that the natural world is open to the actions of agents, both creaturely and 
divine. Theistic evolution, according to Polkinghorne, pictures God as acting according to 
this universal openness to agency, balancing divine influence with creaturely autonomy. For 
Polkinghorne, the question facing theistic evolution is “the theological problem of grace and 
free will, now writ large.”57 Similarly, Holmes Rolston III placed the importance of 
creaturely experience at the centre of his vision for continuous creation. He writes,  
The notion of a Newtonian Architect who from outside designs his 
machines, borrowed by Paley for his Watchmaker God, has to be replaced 
(at least in biology, if not also in physics) by a continuous creation, a 
developmental struggle in self-education, where the creatures through 
‘experience’ becomes increasingly ‘expert’ at life.58 
For these visions of continuous creation to be meaningful, the roots of experience and agency 
need to reach deeper than higher-level animals to the very beginnings of cosmic evolution. 
Keith Ward suggests that the “main strength” of theistic accounts of evolution is that theists 
“seek to take into account the facts of consciousness and experience in an integrative, 
purposive explanation.”59 Similarly, the argument for panpsychism from continuity (outlined 
above) argues that it is difficult to support the claim that mindless, blind, and empty natural 
processes have the resources to ever produce consciousness and experience (comparisons to 
the emergence of physical properties such as liquidity, and even the emergence of metabolic 
life, are false analogies). Therefore, some proto-consciousness or minimal form of mental 
properties are either injected at some point in evolution by an outside Mind, as an intelligent 
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design proponent might argue, or a basic form of these properties existed since the beginning 
of the universe, and alongside material complexity has been coaxed into development by a 
gentle and loving God. The latter is a panpsychist version of theistic evolution. 
John F. Haught is perhaps the most explicit proponent of a panpsychist theistic evolution. 
Haught rejects the idea, which he suggests is presupposed by both Darwinian materialists and 
Intelligent Design theorists, that evolution entails materialism.60 Instead, Haught argues that, 
“in some sense the created world must be self-actualizing, and even self-creative... Any other 
kind of world, in fact, is theologically inconceivable.”61 Haught is explicitly influenced by the 
writings of Alfred North Whitehead and Teilhard de Chardin, both of whom argued that the 
only way to articulate Divine presence and guidance throughout and within the entire 
universe is to posit interiority in all things.62 Yet, Haught – like many in contemporary 
science and religion dialogue – cannot swallow all of the aspects of Whiteheadian and 
Teilhardian thought. It is for this reason that the contemporary scholarship on panpsychism in 
philosophy of mind – which is neither Whiteheadian nor Teilhardian (nor Hegelian), should 
be of great interest and aid for science and religious scholars.  
A panpsychist interpretation of theistic evolution allows scholars to make the theological 
moves which many see as imperative for the integrative project of science and religion. 
Panpsychism allows God to non-coercively guide evolution in a non-interventionist manner, 
which is beyond the sphere of empirical investigation, and therefore, cannot be confused as a 
faux-scientific hypothesis. If creation is imbued with subjectivity and the capacity to 
experience (in a minimal and basic way), then the language of self-creativity, prior to the 
emergence of autopoiesis and life, becomes a more robustly meaningful concept. This 
provides theological rational for the first ten-fourteen billion years of the universe, during 
which God is neither absent nor inactive in space and time, but as engaged as God has always 
been and continues to be, in a loving relationship with a creation yet imperfect and 
incomplete.  
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Conclusion 
The revival of panpsychism within contemporary philosophy of mind may be a highly 
significant development for Christian theologians engaged in the field of science and 
religion.63 By disentangling a theory of fundamental experience or subjectivity from its 
previous historical and theological associations, contemporary panpsychism offers scholars a 
new picture of the universe as open at every point to the influence and direction of a loving, 
non-coercive, but Almighty and Trinitarian Creator. For scholars who consider the 
deterministic and causally closed view of the world put forward by the materialist and 
mechanistic philosophy of science to be a challenge to the Christian faith, panpsychism offers 
a promising way forward. For theologians who wish to speak of God persuading and co-
operating with the natural world, but do not wish to limit God’s actions to a tiny fraction of 
space-time, panpsychism seems unavoidable.  
Panpsychism offers an enchanted and value-laden picture of the cosmos and roots humanity 
deep within our native universe; this is our home, even our souls arise from the dust of the 
earth. With no mysterious ontological jumps (such as in emergence theory), human 
consciousness is decisively not to be confused with divinity and remains inseparable from 
embodiment. This is a view of consciousness which should be of interest not only to 
contemporary philosophers of mind but also to theologians within the field of science and 
religion and beyond. Whilst the natural sciences cannot verify absolutely any one metaphysic, 
it has been shown above – perhaps to the surprise of many – that panpsychism finds some 
resonance and traction with popular interpretations of quantum physics and some 
philosophical principles of evolutionary biology. The scientific credentials of panpsychism 
should not be overstated; most scientists still favour a materialistic view of reality. However, 
the results of this paper’s investigation show that theologians can be emboldened to adopt 
panpsychism, without having to abandon a healthy respect for the conclusions of empirical 
research. The universe may just turn out to be more weird and wonderful yet.  
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